

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 PM-03 SP-02 L-02

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 IO-03 DODE-00 DRC-01

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P 072300Z JUN 74

FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5663

INFO AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY

RUESMGJAMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 524

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA PRIORITY

USCINCSO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SAN SALVADOR 2283

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652 - GDS

TAGS: PFOR, ES, HO, CR, GT, NU

SUBJECT: HONDURAS/EL SALVADOR DISPUTE: POST-JALAPA PROSPECTS

REF: A) TEGUCIGALPA 2336; B) SAN SALVADOR 2192;

C) MANAGUA 2159; D) TEGUCIGALPA 2295

USCINCSO FOR POLAD; GUATEMALA FOR ROCAP

1. SUMMARY FOLLOWING IS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE JALAPA SUMMIT AS WELL AS
OUR COMMENTS ON THE VIEWS OF SOME OF THE OTHER CA LEADERS AS
EXPRESSED TO OUR MISSIONS. END SUMMARY

2. FIRST, JALAPA, LIKE ALL OTHER RECENT EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE
HONDURAS/SALVADOR DISPUTE, BROKE DOWN AS THE RESULT OF THE
PERSISTENT INTRACTABILITY OF THE DISPUTANTS ON THE ISSUE OF
BOUNDARY DELINEATION, AN ISSUE REGARDED
BY THE GOES AS EXTREMELY

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DELICATE AND POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS.

(CONSIDER OUR ANALYSIS ON THE STATEMENT OF THE MEXICO TALKS - SS 4749 OF DECEMBER 21, 1973 - STILL VALID.) HONDURAS CONTINUES TO HOLD THAT THERE WILL BE NO FORWARD MOVEMENT ON ANY OTHER ASPECT OF NORMALIZATION UNTIL A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE BOUNDARY QUESTION IS FOUND; AS FON MIN BATRES TOLD BORGONOVO (REF A), HONDURAS IS CONCERNED THAT SALVADOR WILL SIMPLY DRAG ITS FEET ON THE BOUNDARY QUESTION IF HONDURAS SHOULD FIRST MAKE CONCESSIONS ON TRADE AND TRANSIT (BATRES' CONCERN IS UNDERSTANDABLE SINCE SALVADOR WOULD BE HAPPY TO PUT OFF THE WHOLE BOUNDARY ISSUE FOR ANOTHER GENERATION OR MORE). EL SALVADOR IS MORE THAN READY TO AGREE TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, TRADE, ETC.; BUT, AS REGARDS THE BOUNDARY, IT CAN ACCEPT ONLY AN ACCORD PROVIDING FOR TOTAL DELINEATION (RATHER THAN PARTIAL) ACCORDING TO AGREED METHODS AND PRINCIPLES BUT WHICH DOES NOT ITSELF DEFINE WHERE THE BOUNDARY LIES. IN EFFECT, SALVADOR WANTS AN AGREEMENT THAT HIDES FROM THE PUBLIC ANY HINT THAT IT MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE TERRITORIAL "CONCESSIONS" AS PART OF A BOUNDARY DELINEATION BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON THE GROUND ITSELF. IT CANNOT AFFORD TO HAVE THIS POSSIBILITY PINPOINTED IN WRITING EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE FACT OF DELINEATION, (OF COURSE, DELINEATION ON THE GROUND WOULD BE NO EASY TASK EITHER SINCE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY AREAS CURRENTLY POPULATED BY SALVADORANS AND UNDER GOES JURISDICTION COULD BE CEDED TO HONDURAS).

3. TO THE MOLINA GOVERNMENT, IF SETTLEMENT MEANS PUBLICIZED TERRITORIAL "CONCESSIONS", THE COST MAY WELL BE UNTIMELY REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND HERE, AS ELSEWHERE, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME. FON MIN BORGONOVO REALIZED THAT SIMPLY BRINGING THE CA LEADERS TOGETHER WOULD NOT PRODUCE ANY MAGIC SOLUTION TO THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM AND IF ACCORD WAS NOT TO BE REACHED AT THIS TIME, BETTER THAT IT FAIL AT THE PREPARATORY LEVEL THAN AT A SUMMIT. SOMOZA'S "SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY", THEN, REPRESENTED A NEGOTIATION PROCESS THAT FAILED. THE SUMMIT WAS NOT TORPEDOED; IT JUST NEVER REALLY GOT LAUNCHED.

4. AS TO IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, THE JALAPA EXPERIENCE POINTS ONCE AGAIN TO THE DEBILITATING EFFECT OF SPOTLIGHTING SUCH CONFERENCES, WHICH ON ONE HAND RAISES POPULAR EXPECTATIONS AND THE OTHER STIFFENS NEGOTIATING POSTURES. SALVADOR HAS ALL ALONG HELD
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THAT SECRET, BILATERAL CONTACTS OFFER THE BEST SETTING FOR RESOLVING THE HONDURAS/SALVADOR DISPUTE AND ITS BELIEF IS NO DOUBT REINFORCED BY ITS MOST RECENT EXPERIENCE. (THE SALVADORANS WOULD CERTAINLY CONCUR WITH GENERAL SOMOZA'S VIEW THAT ODUBER'S AND FACIO'S PUBLIC COMMENTS ABOUT JALAPA WERE LESS THAN HELPFUL.)

5. THE GOES MAY ALSO BE REASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE CA NETURAL THREE IN THE WAKE OF THE NON-SUMMIT. WHILE BRINGING ODUBER AND

COMPANY INTO THE ACT AS FRIENDLY NEUTRALS HAS HELD SOME APPEAL TO THE GOES, THEIR PRESENCE MAY NOT BE WORTH THE PUBLICITY THAT THE COSTA RICANS INEVITABLY SEEM TO GENERATE ABOUT SUCH GATHERINGS; AND THE GOES MAY CONSIDER THEIR PARTICIPATION LESS DESIRABLE IN THE FUTURE. CONCERNING GENERAL SOMOZA'S ROLE AS A MEDIATOR, OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SALVADORANS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY

DUBIOUS ABOUT HIS NEUTRALITY, PARTICULARLY AFTER SOMOZA'S HEATED REMARKS TO BORGONOVO (REF A) WHICH THE LATTER CHARACTERIZED TO US AS "REVEALING SOMOZA'S ANTI-SALVADORAN BIAS." (THE SALVADORANS MAY SUBJECT SOMOZA'S STANDING AS A NEUTRALIN THE HONDURAS/ SALVADOR DISPUTE TO EVEN GREATER SCRUTINY FOLLOWING HIS RECENT INTERVIEW WITH THE COSTA RICAN PRESS, REPUBLISHED AND CRITICIZED BY THE PRESS HERE, IN WHICH HE REPORTEDLY REVEALED THAT HE TIPPED OFF LOPEZ ARELLANO TO SALVADOR'S INVASION DECISION IN 1969.) IN THE CASE OF GUATEMALA, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE GOG WAS LESS THAN SANGUINE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SUMMIT FROM THE BEGINNING AND HAD NO INTEREST IN PROMOTING IT. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HERE TO SUPPORT FONMIN MONTIEL'S SSERTION THAT THE GOG PRESSURED SALVADOR TO WITHDRAW NOR THAT THE GOG "DOMINATES" SALVADORAN THINKING. WHILE SALVADOR, BY DEFAULT IF FOR NO OTHER REASON, IS PERHAPS CLOSER TO GUATEMALA THAN TO THE OTHER CA'S AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME, WE DO NOT DISCERN ANY SPECIAL INFLUENCE BY THE GOG OVER THE GOES DECISION MAKING PROCESS. FURTHERMORE, GUATEMALA'S COACHING ON JALAPA WOULD HAVE BEEN SUPERFLUOUS IN ANY EVENT SINCE THE GOES WAS INDEPENDENTLY DUBIOUS OF ATTENDING A SUMMIT WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT WITH HONDURAS ON THE BOUNDARY QUESTION.

6. SOMOZA'S CONTENTION THAT MOLINA RENIGED ON AN AGREEMENT TO SETTLE AND THUS SABOTAGED THE SUMMIT (REF C) DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE BORNE OUT EITHER BY WHAT BORGONOVO OR BATRES HAD TO TELL US.

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NEITHER BORGONOVO'S VERSION OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS (REF B) NOR THAT GIVEN OUR AMBASSADOR IN TEGUCIGALPA BY BATRES (REF A) AND LOPEZ (REF D) MENTIONS THAT THE DISPUTANTS HAD REACHED AGREEMENT AT ANY STAGE BUT QUITE THE CONORARY. IT WOULD SEEM LIKELY THAT THE GOH WOULD HAVE CITED IT TO US TO PROVE THE GOES' LACK OF GOOD NEGOTIATING FAITH HAD SUCH AN ACCORD BEEN ACHIEVED. WE CAN APPRECIATE SOMOZA'S ASSERTION, FROM HIS OWN VANTAGE POINT, THAT MOLINA'S GOVERNMENT SUFFERS FROM A WEAKNESS OF LEADERSHIP STEMMING FROM HIS INSECURITY VIS A VIS HIS ARMED FORCES. HOWEVER, THE SALVADORAN MILITARY HAS TRADITIONALLY PLAYED AN ACTIVE POLITICAL ROLE IN CONTRAST TO THE NICARAGUAN MILITARY. CERTAINLYTHE MILITARY IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT HERE AND MOLINA CANNOT AND WILL NOT IGNORE THEIR VIEWS. BUT IF THE ISSUE IS TERRITORIAL "CONCESSION", MOLINA HIMSELF WOULD NEED NO PROMPTING FROM HIS MILITARY TOTAKE A STRONG STAND. HE WOULD DO SO ON THE

BASIS OF HIS OWN BELIEFS. WE AGREE WITH SOMOZA'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE SALVADORANS BELIEVE THAT THE LESS STABLE TH REGIME IN TEGUCIGALPA THE HARDER IT WOULD BE TO NEGOTIATE WITH AND THE MORE DIFFICULT FOR IT TO IMPLEMENT ANY ACCORD THAT MIGHT BE REACHED.

7. THE FAILURE OF JALAPA, WHILE DISHEARTENING, IS LESS A SERIOUS SETBACK THAN ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION OF HOW INTRACTABLE THE HONDURAS/SALVADOR POSITIONS ARE. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN FAR MORE

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 PM-03 SP-02 L-02

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 IO-03 DODE-00 DRC-01

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P 072300Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5664
INFO AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE PRIORITY
AMEMBJSY TEGUCIGALPA PRIORITY

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SERIOUS HAD THE MEETING TAKEN PLACE AND ENDED WITHOUT AGREEMENT, AS APPEARED TO BE PROBABLE.
BORGONOVO HAS POINTED OUT THE POSITION OF THE DISPUTANTS REMAINS THE SAME AS IT DID WHEN THE MEXICO TALKS WERE SUSPENDED.
NOTHING HAS BEEN GAINED BUT NOTHING HAS BEEN LOST EITHER EXCEPT FOR SOME EFFORT. CERTAINLY THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT HAS HAD MINIMAL DOMESTIC IMPACT IN EL SALVADOR SINCE MOST OBSERVERS FELT IT HAD LITTLE CHANCE OF PROSPERING IN THE FIRST PLACE AND SEEM TO BE RELIEVED THAT IT DID NOT TAKE PLACE. THE BORDER REMAINS FAIRLY QUIET (BOTH HONDURAS AND SALVADOR NOW ADMIT THAT THEIR PROTESTS AND COUNTER-PROTESTS ABOUT INCIDENTS WERE IN LARGE

PART PROPAGANDA PLOYS FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION), THE MILITARY OF THE TWO SIDES REMAIN IN CONTACT AND NEITHER GOVERNMENT APPEARS INTERESTED IN ADOPTING A MORE BELICOSE STANCE. THE FACT THAT BOTH SOUGHT AN INNOCUOUS FINAL COMMUNIQUE WHICH BLAMED POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT ON NO ONE SHOWS THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO SLAM THE DOOR ON THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IN SUM, NEITHER IS INCLINED TO PRESS THE DISPUTE TO THE POINT OF SERIOUS AGGRAVATION, BUT NEITHER IS WILLING TO PAY THE PRICE REQUIRED FOR NORMALIZATION.

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8. AS TO THE FUTURE, FON MIN BORGONOVO WILL CONDUCT HIS "TECHNICAL" STUDY ON THE BOUNDARY QUESTION AS WE REPORTED IN REF B, AND THIS COULD BE THE BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENT INITIATIVES WITH THE HONDURANS. IF BORGONOVO COMES UP WITH A FORMULA THAT HE BELIEVES PROVIDES AN OPENING TO THE GOH THAT HE CAN ALSO SELL AT HOME, HE WILL PROBABLY SEEK PRIVATE SESSION WITH BARTRES AS THE LATTER HAS ALREADY SUGGESTED (REF A) WITH NO SPOTLIGHTS, NO DRAMATIC ANNOUNCEMENTS AND NO THIRD PARTIES. IF HE CANNOT FIND SUCH A FORMULA, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE SALVADORANS WILL BE WILLING IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO ENGAGE IN ANY MORE SUMMITRY ON THE ISSUE, NO MATTER WHO PUSHES FOR IT, PARTICULARLY IF THE VENTURE IS PUBLICIZED.

9. WHEN THE OAS COMMITTEE OF SEVEN REVIEWS THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TWO FON MINS, BORGONOVO WILL PROBABLY TAKE THE POSITION THAT PRE-JALAPA CONTACTS MERELY REPRESENTED ANOTHER ROUND OF UNSUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS, THAT MORE PREPARATION AND

GROUNDWORK IS NEEDED, AND THAT THE GOES REMAINS COMMITTED TO FURTHER BILATERAL EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE. (SHOULD THE HONDURANS INSIST ON INVOKING THE PACT OF BOGOTA, HOWEVER, THE SALVADORAN REACTION IS LIKELY TO BE BOTH VIGOROUS AND UNCONCILIATORY.)

IF THE SUGGESTION IS MADE TO PLACE THE DISPUTE BEFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, SALVADOR WOULD PROBABLY VIEW THE PROPOSAL APPREHENSIVELY SINCE IT IS PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND PLACING THE ISSUE BEFORE THE ENTITY, EVEN IF ONLY AS A MEDIATOR, HOLDS THE OSTENSIBLE RISK OF MAKING THEM VULNERABLE TO EVENTUAL ARBITRATIONS. SALVADOR WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO RESIST SUCH A PROPOSAL IF THE CA NEUTRAL THREE ON THE COMMITTEE STRONGLY ESPOUSED IT AND IF HONDURAS WERE TO ACCEPT IT.

10. I AM PLANNING TO SEEK A PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MOLINA AT AN EARLY DATE TO OBTAIN HIS VIEWS ON THIS TROUBLESOME ISSUE.
CAMPBELL

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Message Attributes

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